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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bills and Notes-Release Clauses in Stop Payment Orders
A depositor wanted to stop payment on a check drawn by him and
not yet presented to the drawee bank for payment. He signed a "Re-
quest to Stop Payment" on a printed form given him by the bank's
clerk. The "request" contained the following release under seal: "Should
the check be paid through inadvertence, accident, or oversight, it is
expressly agreed that the bank will in no way be held responsible. The
bank receives this request upon the express condition that it shall not
be in any way liable for its act should the check be paid by it in the
course of its business. The undersigned agrees to be legally bound
hereby." Three days later the check was paid by the drawee bank
"through inadvertence, accident, or oversight" and charged against the
drawer's account. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing a Su-
perior Court decision,' held the release clause void as against public
policy.2
The effectiveness or validity of release clauses has been decided so
far in eight states and in one federal district court.8 Until the recent
Pennsylvania decision, the majority of jurisdictions had held such
clauses to be enforceable. 4 It is, of course, well established that "at
common law a bank is liable to the drawer of a check for payment after
receipt of a proper non-payment notice." 5 The two points on which the
courts are obliged to examine such clauses have been (1) the considera-
tion question and (2) the public policy question.
As to the first, some courts have held that the consideration to the
bank for the express agreement not to pay the check grows out of the
"mercantile relation of the parties and the reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions which the law attaches to that relation." 6 The common law liability
'Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton, 173 Pa. Super. 205, 96 A. 2d 196
(1953).
'Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A. 2d 910 (1954).
'California, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Federal District Court of Puerto Rico.
'New York, Massachusetts, Indiana, Federal District Court of Puerto Rico, and
Pennsylvania had held such release clauses enforceable. The principal case re-
versed a decision in 173 Pa. Super. 205, 96 A. 2d 196 (1953). This case had itself
overruled two decisions of the Pennsylvania District and County Court, Michaels
v. First National Bank of Scranton, 73 Pa. D. & C. 557 (1951); and Adams v.
Homewood Bank at Pittsburgh, 76 Pa. D. & C. 557 (1951). The principal case
also distinguished an early Pennsylvania case, Cohen v. State Bank of Philadelphia,
69 Pa. Super. 40 (1917), holding such agreements enforceable.
' Stearne, J. in Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, 184,
101 A. 2d 910, 911 (1954).
' Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 401, 126 N. E. 782, 784 (1920).
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of the bank may be limited provided the limitation has the consent of the
depositor.7 This result is based on the theory that freedom of contract
must be upheld. On the other hand, it has been found by other courts
that while the reciprocal rights and obligations inherent in the depositor-
bank relation are sufficient to supply consideration for the bank's liability
to stop payment, the release agreement is something new and requires
additional consideration moving from the bank to the depositor. Absent
such additional consideration the bank receives benefit but suffers no
detriment.8 To the argument that the consideration for the depositor's
release was the bank's not cancelling his account but allowing him to
continue as a depositor with the bank, it has been answered that such
consideration was not bargained for in exchange for the release agree-
ment and therefore could not constitute a valid consideration. 9 It has
been suggested that promissory estoppel might supply the missing ele-
ment of bargaining.'0 The importance of consideration as a question
for the court has, however, declined in recent years due to the rise of the
public policy question.
As to the question of public policy, the courts favoring the validity
of such clauses take the attitude that "inadvertence" includes negligence"
and is intended to exonerate the bank from the negligence of its em-
ployees, and further hold that this -exoneration is not against public
policy.12 The rationale is that, before it can be said that public policy
has been contravened, it must be shown that the contract has a tendency
to injure the public, is against public good, or is inconsistent with sound
' Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929). The court went
further to say that a stop payment order, if it is not wished that the bank's liability
be limited, should be positive and unqualified. A Bank not wishing to assume such
liability may cancel the depositor's account and thus cancel the relationship. See
Chase National Bank of New York v. Battat et al., 297 N. Y. 185, 190, 78 N. E. 2d
465, 467 (1948).
8 Speroff v. First Century Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. 2d 119 (1948).
The court held (1) that an oral order to stop payment was sufficient and (2) that
a subsequent written agreement containing the release clause was without con-
sideration. There is an excellent annotation in 1 A. L. R. 2d 1155 (1948).
' Calamita v. Tradesman's National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. 2d 46 (1949);.
Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton National Bank and Trust Co., 16 N. J. Super. 430,
84 A. 2d 741 (1951), aff'd ne~n., 9 N. J. 607, 89 A. 2d 242 (1952) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 75(1) (1932). However, had there been a recital that the continuance
of the relation was bargained for as consideration, the clause would have been
enforceable as far as the consideration is concerned, and the courts might have
been forced into the public pplicy field. Such was the situation in the principal
case.
1025 N. Y. U. L. REv., 419, 421 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932);
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139 (rev. ed. 1936).
"' South Carolina, in Carroll v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 211 S. C. 406, 45
S. E. 2d 729 (1947) held that the burden of proof was on the bank to show in-
advertence or oversight in payment. In Martinez v. National City Bank of N. Y.,
80 F. Supp. 545 (D. Puerto Rico 1948) (the only federal case concerning release
-agreements in stop payment orders) it was held that the bank is not liable for
negligent payment under such an agreement as long as there is no wilful disregard
of the order.
"Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782 (1920).
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policy and good morals, either as to consideration or as to things to be
done or not done. Further, goes the reasoning, it is actually to the best
interest of the public that there be freedom of contract. Therefore such
agreements should not be held void as against public policy unless they
contravene what the legislature or judiciary has clearly established as
public policy.' 3
In two states the public policy question is a cut and dried matter.
California and Pennsylvania have declared by statute that such agree-
ments are not enforceable.' 4 But where there is no statute, the courts
have not been backward about making themselves the source of public
policy based on well recognized common law principles. For example,
in Ohio the supreme court held that a contract to relieve a bank of
liability on account of inadvertence or oversight was against public policy
and did not relieve the bank of its duty to act in good faith and exercise
reasonable care.'5 The New Jersey court did not have to decide the
public policy question since it found a lack of consideration; however,
the court suggested that banks be treated in the same way as quasi-
public enterprises such as utilities, common carriers and the like, which
are deprived of power to enforce release clauses of the type here in-
volved.' 6 This was the theory on which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court declared the release in the principal case to be against public
policy. Since the consideration question was answered by the Uniform
Written Obligations Act 7 and further by the release being under seal,
'the court likened banks to common carriers and public utilities, reason-
ing that all banks are subject to rigid state and federal controls and that
every person must use such controlled banks if they are to use a bank
at all. Since in Pennsylvania it is against public policy to allow a com-
mon carrier to limit its liability,' 8 the court held it also against public
" Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488 (1932).
"California was the first to have such a statute, CALIF. CIv. CoDE § 1668
(Deering, 1949) : "Certain contracts unlawful. All contracts which have for their
object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of the
law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law." Such release
agreements were held to be in violation of this statute in Hiroshima v. Bank of
Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926); Grisinger v. Golden State Bank, 92
Cal. App. 433, 268 P. 425 (1928). The Pennsylvania Statute, a part of the Uniform
Commercial Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 4-103(1) (Purdon, 1954), was put
into effect on 1 July 1954, too late to be applied by the court in the principal case.
It reads as follows: "The effect of the provisions of this article may be varied by
agreement, except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility to limit
the measure of damages for its own* lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordi-
nary care."
1" Speroff v. First Century Trust Co., 194 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. 2d 119 (1948).
" Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton National Bank and Trust Co., 16 N. J. Super.
430, 84 A. 2d 741 (1951), aff'd inent., 9 N. J. 607, 89 A. 2d 242 (1952).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 6 (Purdon, 1949) (the words "The undersigned
agrees to be legally bound hereby." eliminate the necessity 'for consideration.).
18 Turek v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 361 Pa. 512, 64 A. 2d 779 (1949) ; Cole-
man v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 242 Pa. 304, 89 Atl. 87 (1913).
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policy to allow a bank to do so. While these two areas are not completely
analogous, since banks are not required to accept all persons who apply
for their services as are utilities and common carriers, still there is
enough similarity to enable the Pennsylvania court to reach its desired
result.
Another point to consider is that although, theoretically, the bank
and depositor have equal bargaining power, in actuality they do not.
The depositor, not being so well versed in his rights as the bank, is
usually made to feel that the bank is doing him a favor and thinks that
he is obligated to sign whatever release he is given.' 9 Also the bank
has the deeper pocket, is better protected by insurance, and is therefore
better able to absorb the loss. 20 Then too, the loss may be distributed
through service charges on stop payment notices.21 These are not legal
considerations, but they are some of the things which go into making up
public policy.
No North Carolina decision has yet passed on the validity of release
clauses or agreements in stop payment orders.- However, in Miller's
Mutual Fire Insurance A.is'n v. Parker22 the court has held that a
parking lot owner, "a professional bailee," could not, by giving notice
orally, on signs or printed on the claim check, relieve himself of liability
for loss by fire or theft of the cars placed under his care. And from the
common carrier angle, the court recently held in Crowell v. Eastern Air
Lines23 that an airline could not limit its liability for accidents by an
agreement on the ticket requiring, as a prerequisite to action .predicated
thereon, that all accident claims be filed within ninety days, since such
a limitation is void as against public policy. In view of these two cases
it does not seem that the North Carolina Supreme Court would look
with much favor on a release agreement in a stop payment order.
Only time and litigation can tell what the courts will do in the future
with respect to such release agreements. However, with the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code24 by more and more states, it would seem
that release agreements are doomed to be held against public policy even
more frequently in the future than they have been in the past.
PAUL B. GUTHERY, JR.
10 See Note, 29 CoT. L. REv. 1150 (1929).
20 See Comment, 25 TEMp. L. Q. 486 (1952).
2 See Note, 27 N. Y. U. L. REV. 345, 348 (1952).
22234 N. C. 20, 65 S. E. 2d 341 (1951).
2 240 N. C. 20, 81 S. E. 2d 178 (1954).
2
' Supra note 14.
